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Marine systems are complex and highly variable. Feedback is required to learn in
and manage these systems. Unfortunately, feedback in complex marine systems is difficult to
capture and ambiguous.
Feedback is a function of system structure. Conventional fisheries management
simplifies this structure by focusing on individual species. It assumes that variability in
populations is due solely to changes in the adult population (i.e., that a stock-recruitment
relationship exists) and all necessary feedback is available by simply observing the size of
the adult population. Unfortunately, this approach does not consider the environment of the
species and most marine stocks show poor functional stock-recruitment relationships.
Complex systems (hierarchy) theory suggests that this approach may not be the most
appropriate way to simplify the system. Hierarchy theory simplifies the system on the basis
of nearly decomposable subsystems, whose boundaries are defined by rates of interactions. It
implies that feedback can be captured more readily within than between subsystems and that
there is more pattern stability at the subsystem level than at the species level in the system.

This implies that feedback is best captured from subsystems, not from changes in the
abundance of indiiidual species.
Fishermen have traditionally dealt with variability by utilizing one of two harvesting
strategies. With the Little Box approach, fishermen target a single species across multiple
subsystems, averaging the variability. With the Big Box approach, fishermen target multiple
species within a subsystem, relying on the relative stability of that subsystem. We
+

hypothesize if less noise exists at the subsystem level than at the species level, then better
feedback can be gained with a Big Box approach to management.
Two age-structured, multispecies, bioeconomic models were created to explore the
two harvesting rights regimes described above in terms of how well they allow decisionmakers to capture and respond to feedback. The Little Box model allocates rights to single
species across subsystems. The Big Box model allocates rights to multiple species within a
I

subsystem.
Results of the models illustrate significant advantages for sole ownership compared to
open access. The baseline model assumes a sole owner with perfect abilities and high quality
and timely information. Results show little difference between Big Box and Little Box
management under these "perfect" conditions. The model was then run under various
scenarios to reflect imperfect feedback conditions (e.g., measurement errors, delayed
response times). Impairment of the sole owner's ability to respond to feedback and
degradation of the quality of feedback resulted in advantages for the Big Box sole owner
over the Little Box sole owner.
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CHAPTER 1:
MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS OF COMPLEXITY IN MARINE SYSTEMS
Introduction
Complex systems are found everywhere -examples include social systems (e.g.,
formal organizations), biological systems (e.g., organisms), physical systems (e.g., matter),
and symbolic systems (e.g., books composed of chapters, sentences, words, etc.) (Simon,
1962). There is a large body of literature devoted to the study of the organization and
behavior of complex systems. This theory spans multiple disciplines including physics,
mathematics, biological sciences, computer programming, economics, and the social
sciences (Simon, 1962; Pattee, 1973; 07Neillet al, 1986; Waldrop, 1992). Researchers
from these diverse disciplines have made progress towards understanding complex systems
and recognize hierarchy theory as the tool most useful in understanding the organization
and behavior of complex systems. This is because, as we will see, hierarchy "is one of the
central structural schemes that the architect of complexity uses" (Simon, 1962).
Marine ecosystems are complex systems (e.g., Steele, 1974; Cushing, 1975;
Laevastu, 1996; Levin, 1999) and some may even be chaotic (e.g., Wilson et. al., 1991).
Similar to other complex systems, they are characterized by strong (often non-linear)
interactions, complex feedback loops, time and space lags, discontinuities, thresholds and
limits (Costanza et al., 1993; Holling, 1987). Complexity creates many difficulties for those
seeking to manage marine resources (Ludwig et al, 1993; Dayton, 1998). Conventional
fisheries management tries to simplify this complexity by focusing on individual species
populations. Additionally, the conventional approach typically seeks to reduce fishing
mortality by controlling fishing effort. Rules utilized by this approach usually focus solely
on numerical controls (e.g., Wilson et al, 1994; Acheson and Wilson, 1996). Marine
resource managers are now struggling to improve this approach in order to address the
.complex nature of the environment (e.g., Sherman, 1991; OECD, 1997). In particular, there

is increasing interest in developing an ecosystem approach to management (e.g., Sherman,
1991; Apollonio, 1994; Larkin, 1996; Laevastu, 1996; NMFS, 1998; and Fogarty and
Murawski, 1998; Wilson, 2001).
One significant source of difficulty resulting from the complex nature of the system
lies in learning how to make meaningful management decisions (i.e., how to know if rules
will result in sustainable resource use) (Wilson, 2001). The variability and complexity of
interactions in the system make it impossible for us to predict the results of our actions.
Unless we know how the system will respond to human intervention (or how our actions
may influence the structure and function of the system) we cannot make informed
decisions. Additionally, with this uncertainty, particularly regarding the future of the
system, users have little or no incentive to adopt a conservation or stewardship ethic. This is
because a user only has an incentive to restrain hisher activities today if they believe they
will receive benefits from that restraint in the future. With the high levels of variability and
complexity in the system, users cannot be assured that they will benefit from any
conservation efforts that they make.
Holland (1998) describes the difficulties of learning in complex systems and offers
insight into how pattern feedback can facilitate the learning process.' Holland (1998) uses
the example of the checker board game to illustrate how, with feedback, we can learn how
the system responds to outside influences such as exploitation and management. Holland
explains how we unconsciously use feedback in our everyday lives to develop conceptual
models that allow us to cope with the uncertain nature of the complex world around us. In
creating these models, we focus on the important components and interactions in the system
and ignore unnecessary details. With these models, we learn how to act and what we might
expect will result from our actions.

' Feedback can be defined simply as: "Influence on a system component mediated by changes induced by
that component" (Levin, 1999, 233).
2

Ulanowicz (1997) similarly describes how with "propensities" we can find order in
complex systems.2Propensities are the tendencies that certain circumstances might occur
within a given context (Ulanowicz, 1997,37) and are basically probabilities that are
contingent upon circumstances and interfering events (Ulanowicz, 1997,38). By paying
attention to system propensities, it is possible to gain at least a qualitative understanding of
the system.
However, as will be discussed, the nature of feedback (and propensities) in complex
systems is imperfect, which has important implications for fisheries management. This
chapter reviews complexity and hierarchy theory and attempts to apply these concepts to the
study and management of marine systems. After reviewing the theory of complex systems
and describing marine systems as complex, the implications of this complexity, particularly
the problems posed by imperfect feedback, are explored.

What are Complex Adaptive Systems?
Simon (1962) defined a complex system as "one made up of a large number of
parts that interact in a nonsimple way." Simon (1962) further explained that "complexity
frequently takes the form of hierarchy and that hierarchic systems have some common
properties that are independent of their specific content." O'Neill et al. (1986) extensively
reviewed hierarchy theory as it is applicable to understanding the structure and function of
ecosystems. Properties common to hierarchic complex systems, as described primarily by
Simon (1962, 1996) and O'Neill et al(1986), are summarized in the following ~ection.~

Nearly Decomposable Subsystems
Hierarchy theory finds that complex systems are composed of multiple subsystems
that are described as nearly decompo~able.~
By nearly decomposable, it is meant that
Ulanowicz borrows the concept of propensities from Karl Popper.
Many ideas of this section also resulted from of a seminar discussion on ecological approaches to fisheries
management led by Dr. James Wilson at the University of Maine in the Spring 2000.
Subsystems are simply the individual components that make up the system.

despite interactions between subsystems, boundaries can still be defined. At a given level in
the hierarchy, subsystem boundaries are distinguished on the basis of rates - rates of
interactions. Interactions are more frequent and intense within subsystems than between
subsystems. Also, the subsystems themselves can be viewed as hierarchic in structure until
some lowest subsystem level. The levels in the hierarchy are nearly decomposable because
they can be isolated from each other according to the distinctly different rates at which they
operate. Processes "higher" in the hierarchy exhibit slower rates than processes at the
"bottom" of the hierarchy (O'Neill et al, 1986). Again, the subsystems (and components
of subsystems) are considered nearly decomposable since they can be isolated from each
other. Hierarchy theory allows us to simplify complex adaptive systems by focusing on the
near redundancy that is inherent in their organization (Low et al, 200 1).
An example of a complex system that is widely cited is a forest (e.g., O'Neill et al

(1986; Pahl-Wostl, 1995). For simplicity, the system here is viewed as being composed of
an assemblage of trees, which are composed of their individual parts (e.g., leaves).
Individual tree leaves respond rapidly to momentary changes in light intensity. The leaves
respond by either increasing or decreasing photosynthesis. However, the growth of a tree
responds more slowly to these short-term changes. Additionally, the species composition
of the forest changes even more slowly, on the time scale of decades or centuries. Therefore,
processes occurring lower in the system (i.e., the reaction of the tree leaves to changes in
light intensity) are rapid in comparison to the processes that occur higher in the system and
do not have as large an impact on the system. The reactions that occur within a single leaf
will not drastically alter the entire forest. The processes occurring higher in the hierarchy
(e.g., tree growth) occur very slowly and have large impacts on the system. Despite the
rapid processes that occur at the lower levels, the forest generally appears stable. This is
because the processes occurring at the lower levels are averaged or smoothed as they
"move" up the hierarchy. That is, the higher levels constrain the fast dynamics that occur
at the lower levels. The processes occurring at that level result in emergent properties of the

tree that we see at a higher level (e.g., leaf color). When we view the forest from the scale of
an individual tree, we can essentially ignore what happens at the level of the individual leaf
(e.g., how the leaf responds to changes in light). It is not necessary for us to know exactly
the processes that occur at the level of the individual leaf to know whether the tree is healthy.
By losing the detail that occurs at the scale of the individual tree leaf, we simplify what is
otherwise a very complex system.
The hierarchy can also be viewed as a series of constraints that act on the rates of
processes in the system, which exist at multiple scales (O'Neill et al. 1986; Apollonio,
1994). A constraint is something that functions to slow down system dynamics, increase
relative stability and predictability, and integrate system components (O'Neill et al, 1986).
The higher constraints are characterized by slow dynamics and cover a broad spatial area.
The lower constraints are characterized by fast dynamics and have only a limited impact on
the system. In the example above, the growth rate of the tree limits the rapid dynamics of
the processes occurring within an individual leaf. Therefore, the higher levels are
considered to be constraining the lower levels. The processes occurring at the lower levels
result in emergent properties, which are only viewed at the higher levels in the hierarchy.
Process rates are averaged as the hierarchy is ascended, and thus, there is a loss of detail at
the top of the hierarchy. In other words, the effects of events occurring at lower levels in the
system are diminished by the time they make their way to the system level. The result is that
the dynamics at the system level are generally more stable. Although the composition of
components within a system may change, the system level is considered stable as it is
characterized by familiar and recurrent patterns. Consequently, there is more yalitzttive
predictability at the system level than at the subsystem level.

Feedback Problems
Another important property of complex systems is imperfect feedback. There are
essentially two causes of imperfect feedback. One source of imperfect feedback arises with

the connections that exist between subsystems, which make them nearly decomposable as
opposed to completely decomposable. These connections create leaks through which
feedback is lost.' If there were no leaks, all feedback could be captured locally. Strong,
non-linear interactions between components present additional problems for those seeking
feedback from complex systems. Therefore, even if feedback is captured, it will not be
captured entirely and it will be ambiguous. Ambiguous feedback hinders our ability to
understand the behavior of the system. Both feedback problems pose difficulties as we try
to learn about and understand complex adaptive systems.

Marine Ecosystems as Complex Systems
It is well known that marine systems are complex. The following section attempts to
provide a hypothetical hierarchical description of these complex ecosystems. Here marine
systems are described as spatially organized hierarchies, where marine systems are
composed of spatially discrete, but not completely independent subsystems layered in a
hierar~hy.~
At the level that is referred to as the subsystem level in the hierarchy there are
patchily distributed resources, which are similarly repeated at other locations at the same
scale. The distribution of these resources results from oceanographic processes (e.g.,
currents, gyres), as well as geological and bathymetric features in the system. Boundaries
of the next higher level are defined by where the rate of interactions between subsystems
declines. In other words, unique processes that occur at different rates distinguish each
level in the hierarchy. As one moves from the system to subsystem level or from the top to
the bottom of the hierarchy, process rates increase and dynamics become more variable.

However, feedback lost through these leaks is manifest at the next level in the system and theoretically
could still be captured.
The description below is only one of the many possible ways to organize the structure and behavior of
marine systems using hierarchy theory. For example, one could also organize the system according to
trophic levels.

One could imagine the hierarchy as extending down to infinitely small scale^.^
However, for conceptual purposes, the smallest subsystem considered here is the scale
compatible with what ecologists think of as ecosystems (i.e., self-organized ecological
systems), but with migration occumng between areas. These ecosystems are composed of
interacting abiotic and biotic elements (sensu Whittiker, 1972). Such ecosystems may be
described in terms of energy flow, trophic levels, species interactions, functional groups,
redundancy, stability, resilience, and assembly rules (e.g., Holling, 1973; Paine, 1980;
Walker, 1992; Weiher and Keddy, 1995; Larkin, 1996; Naeem, 1998; Steneck, 2001).

In many ways, the subsystems described here are compatible with the spatially
distributed patches that comprise metapop~lations.~Metapopulation theory has a long
history, but has only recently begun to make its way into the population biology and
conservation literature (Hanksi and Simberloff, 1997). The term metapopulation, first
introduced by Richard Levins in 1969, was used to describe a set of spatially discrete
groups of individuals (Wells and Richmond, 1995). Weins (1997) summarizes the basic
tenets of metapopulation theory below.
[A] metapopulation is spatially subdivided into a series of local (patch)
populations. The classical view emphasizes a balance between
extinctions and recolonizations that facilitates long-term persistence
of the metapopulation...The dynamics of local populations are
density-dependent within patches but asynchronous among patches,
and migration (dispersal) among patches links them together.
However, unlike traditional metapopulation theory, this paper is principally
concerned with the problem of obtaining feedback from disturbance (i.e., the harvesting of)
multi-species assemblages. The patches (i.e., subsystems), therefore, are viewed as
Metacommunities can be defined as "a set of local
comprising metacomm~nities.~
communities in different locations, coupled by dispersal of one or more of their constituent

' For example, another level below the subsystem level is the population (or functional group) level, which
is composed of individuals. Individuals are also made up of subsystems (e.g., organs). As is clear, one could
infinitely continue to dissect the system.
Metapopulations can be defined as "a set of local populations coupled by dispersal" (Hanski, 1990).

members" (Holt, 1997,150). A patch is defined as "a continuous area of space with all
necessary resources for the persistence of a local population and separated by unsuitable
habitat from other patches" (Hanski and Simberloff, 1997).

System Dynamics
As noted, the subsystems (i.e., ecosystems) can be viewed as self-organized
communities (or metacommunities) composed of species and their habitats (e.g., substrate).
Dynamics within a subsystem are highly variable and unpredictable. However, the
interactions between species and between species and their environments result in emergent
properties of the subsystem such as stability and resilience.
For instance, two important interactions that occur within a subsystem are predation
and competition (e.g., for food and/or space). In a food or energy limited system, a
population will either increase or decrease depending on predator and/or competitor
abundance and food availabi~ity.'~That is, when a species' competitors and/or predators
decline, one would expect its population to increase to take up the newly available energy (or
food/space) that now exists (e.g., release from predation or competitive release).' ' As noted
by Levin (1999, 169), "Though individual species may fluctuate more when they are mixed
with other species, the total biomass of all species may be expected to fluctuate less because
some species will be at their peaks while others are at their lows. Individual species take up
the slack for each other, owing in part to independent statistical fluctuation, and no doubt in
part to reduced competitive pressures." In other words, although the species composition of
in the subsystem is likely to change, the subsystem system as a whole will continue to be
relatively stable and show typically recognizable patterns.

Metacommunities do not go extinct, but merely change in species composition.
Ignoring such things as environmental influences, fishing, etc.
" We refer to the replacement in the system of one population by another as compensation. By
replacement, we do not mean that the species is absent from the system, but its influence in the system (in
ternls of energy consumption) has declined. The compensating species is viewed as simply taking up the
newly available energy (or space) in the system.
'O

Although each subsystem may contain the same or a similar assemblage of species,
the species in many ways can be considered local to the subsystem to which they belong.I2
The species in each subsystem are less influenced by conditions existing at other
subsystems, but are similarly influenced by events occurring at a larger scale in the system
(e.g., large-scale phenomenon such as climate change). For example, if a disturbance
occurs at one subsystem, fish of the same species residing in another subsystem may not be
affected at all, except through effects emanating from the larger system. These properties are
consistent with metapopulation (or metacommunity) theory.
The species found within a subsystem fulfill various functions in the subsystem and
typically occupy overlapping niches. It is convenient to organize the species within a
subsystem according to functional grouping (Steneck and Dethier, 1994; Steneck, 2001).
Redundancy within functional groups may be a prerequisite for stable subsystem dynamics
(Stone, 1995; Naeem, 1997; Peterson et al., 1998; Steneck, 2001; Jackson et. al, 2001). For
example, if a species in one functional group is removed from the system, another species in
that same functional group can move in and take its place. This suggests that conservation
should try to maintain the integrity of functional group diversity within an ecosystem.

Hypothetical Hierarchy for the Gulf of Maine
This section attempts to describe the Gulf of Maine region as a hierarchically
organized complex system.
At the top of the hierarchy, there are large marine ecosystems. Sherman and
Alexander (1986) describe large marine ecosystems as being characterized by distinct
hydrographic regimes, submarine topography, productivity, and trophically dependent

l2 One exception to this, however, is migration, which represents one leak through which feedback is lost.
The migrating species represent links (or flows) between subsystems.

populations. These systems are generally greater than 200,000 km. An example of a large
marine ecosystem provided by Sherman (1991) is the U.S. Northeast Continental Shelf. l 3
Sissenwine (1986) describes this large ecosystem as being composed of two
'~
the boundary between these
systems - the Gulf of Maine and Georges ~ a n k . However,
systems is not perfect. The Georges Bank system is connected to the Gulf of Maine and
other regions via water movement, larval drift, and fish migration. Water circulation patterns
in the Gulf of Maine and on Georges Bank involve seasonally variable gyres (Baukus,
1987; Townsend, 1989; Sissenwine, 1984). The gyre in the Gulf of Maine is cyclonic
(counterclockwise), while the gyre operating on Georges Bank is anticyclonic (clockwise).
The gyre in the Gulf of Maine breaks down in the fall and winter and water is allowed to
drift onto Georges Bank. This movement of water from the Gulf of Maine onto Georges
Bank represents a linkage between these two systems. Similarly, the western side of the
gyre on Georges Bank breaks down and water is allowed to drift to the Mid-Atlantic area.
Therefore, although these are not closed systems, the Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank can
be considered two components of a single large system (e.g., Fogarty and Murawski, 1998.)
It is possible to consider these two systems as being composed of subsystems (or
metacommunities). One can imagine these subsystems as being nearly decomposable and
patchily distributed. However, it is difficult to envision exact boundaries of subsystems
within the Gulf of Maine or within Georges Bank. One problem is that the scientific
agenda established for managing fisheries has not been focused on this scale of the system
(Wilson, 2001). Consequently, much of the oceanographic work that has been done in this
region has occurred at a larger scale than the "subsystem" level." However, it is still

l 3 Two other examples of large marine ecosystems given by Shem~an(1991) are the Gulf of Mexico and the
North Sea.
l4 However, considering the biogeographic and oceanographic characteristics of the Northeast Continental
Shelf, this description is somewhat misleading. Georges Bank is clearly separated from the shelf by the
Great South Channel.
l5 Despite the difficulty involved in trying to identify the most appropriate boundaries of these subsystems,
there is evidence that processes occurring at this local scale are important and management should not
ignore this level of the system (Ames, 1996; Hunt von Herbing, et al, 1997).

possible to envision subsystems within these areas. For example, in the Gulf of Maine
these subsystems could be as small as or smaller than Penobscot Bay or as large or larger
than the Bay of Fundy. More work will need to be done before suitable boundaries of these
ecosystems can be described.I6
Ideally, the boundaries should be designed to allow scientists and managers the
ability to capture the most appropriate feedback from the system (Wilson, 2001). It is
possible that sufficient feedback may be gained by focusing management at the scale of
what here is described above as a system.'' In addition, it is likely that future boundaries
established for management purposes will ultimately be determined on the basis of both
ecological and social criteria. For example, if the U.S. chooses to manage Georges Bank as
a separate system from the Gulf of Maine, it will in reality only be managing part of the
bank since the Northeast Peak belongs to Canada.
As noted above, the subsystems (i.e., ecosystems) within these systems (i.e.,
Georges Bank and the Gulf of Maine) can be viewed as metacornmunities composed of
species and their habitats (e.g., substrate).'' Each subsystem is likely to contain the same or
a similar assemblage of species. However, the species in many ways can be considered local
to the subsystem to which they belong. The dynamics that occur within a subsystem (e.g.,
recruitment in individual populations) are highly variable and unpredictable. However, the
interactions between species and between species and their environments should result in
emergent properties of the subsystem (such as pattern stability19).

l6 Since there are really no absolute boundaries in the ocean and the concept of boundaries is mainly
dependent on how the system is viewed andlor the scientific questions being asked, it is in reality
impossible to define exact boundaries in the ocean.
" That is, sufficient feedback may be captured by managing the Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank
separately. Even if in actuality more feedback could be gained by focusing lower in the system, it is a good
place to begin a transition towards an ecosystem approach to management.
However, there is conflicting evidence that makes it difficult for us to know whether these populations
are discrete or metapopulations.

Does the Gulf of Maine Really fit the Descrivtion of a CAS?
The Gulf of Maine region, unlike the generic complex marine system described
previously is characterized by little diversity (including low functional diversity)
(Anonymous, 2000). There are also few species left in this system that interact strongly
(Anonymous, 2000).20This suggests that the system is less stable and predictable than
systems with high diversity and functional redundancy. This does not mean, however, that
the theory described here cannot be applied to this region.

In fact, the Gulf of Maine region may exemplify what happens when the hierarchic
structure of complex marine systems is degraded. Prior to the advent of otter trawling and
the commercialization of fishing, there was an abundance of cod, "haddock", and other
predatory finfish in the system. These predators dominated the system despite hook and
line fishing for at least 5,000 years (Steneck, 1997). However, beginning in the early part of
the 20" century, with the advent of the otter trawl and the commercialization of fisheries,
exploitation of these top predators intensified. Today, these species are now considered to
be ecologically extinct from the region (Steneck, 1997, Steneck, 2001, Jackson et al, 2001).
The system is now largely dominated by commercially less important species (e.g., sculpins,
dogfish, skates) and several invertebrate species (e.g., lobster, crabs, urchins) have also
-

increased in abundance (Steneck, 1997). Harvesting methods (e.g., trawling) have also
contributed to the alteration of the system by reducing the structural complexity of habitats
(Watling and Norse1998; Fogarty and Murawski, 1998). Despite management efforts to
reduce harvesting pressures (e.g., groundfish closures), the once abundant predatory
groundfish populations remain noticeably reduced in the system (Ames, 1997; Murawski et.
al, 2000).

l9 Here stability does not mean individual populations at or near equilibrium, but refers to the tendency of
the system to vary within a range and to show typically recognizable patterns.
This could suggest that compensation between species may not occur, and so the total system biomass
may be variable instead of remaining relatively stable. However, even if species do not interact strongly,
they do interact in the sense that they compete for available energy, which is limited.

According to the systems perspective described above, it appears that, as a result of
harvesting activities, important constraints in the system (e.g., trophic structure, habitat,
spatial distributions) have been removed and the system is more variable than it might be
otherwise. That is, the hierarchic organization has been compromised and this complex
system may no longer be as stable as it may have once been. Wilson (2001) suggests that
maintaining the integrity of the "long time step variables" (e.g., habitat, climate, stock
structure, spatial distributions) increases the likelihood of observing similar configurations
in the system, which makes the system more stable than it might be otherwise. It is possible
that if we restore these system variables, then the system may begin to resemble a more
typical complex system (i.e., one characterized by stable patterns) similar to the one that
existed prior to extensive exploitation by humans.

In summary, marine systems, such as the Gulf of Maine region, can be described as
hierarchically organized complex systems with properties common to other complex
systems. Processes that occur at the top of the hierarchy are slower, but impact a large
spatial area. Processes occurring at the bottom are fast and only influence a small spatial
area. Also, the subsystems and the species comprising the subsystems are constrained by
processes occurring at higher levels (e.g., at the system level). The system is not greatly
influenced by what happens at the subsystem level. Also, rates are averaged as the hierarchy
is ascended, so the system level is more stable and predictable than the subsystem level.
Similarly, events occurring at the subsystem level are more stable and predictable than what
happens within the subsystem. For example, although the biomass of individual species
may be highly variable, the average biomass of the subsystem remains relatively stable (e.g.,
May et. al, 1979; Laevastu and Hayes, 1981, Murawski and Idoine, 1992; Fogarty and
Murawski, 1998; Levin, 1999).

Management Difficulties Posed by Imperfect Feedback
Describing marine systems in terms of hierarchy theory has several implications for
managing fisheries. For successful management systems to evolve, we need to learn what
does and does not work. In order to for us to learn in complex systems, it is essential that
we have feedback from the system (Holland, 1998; Ulanowicz, 1997, Wilson, 2001).
Otherwise, we have no idea what rules work best. Furthermore, we have no way of learning
how to make existing rules more meaningful. Unfortunately, the highly variable nature of
the system makes it very difficult for us to capture, understand, and respond to feedback in
the system.

Capturing Feedback
Feedback from the system is difficult to capture. Some feedback will inevitably be
lost between the flows that connect the subsystems. For example, some feedback will be
lost from an area because of larval drift and migration. In addition, given our human
(imperfect) measurement abilities, we are likely to miss some of the feedback that results
from our actions. As we try to capture feedback from the system, we need to have some
idea what it is that we need to measure and how to measure it. If we do not measure the
"right" things, then we may miss some important feedback. Then at some point we must
analyze and interpret the data and observations that we have made, which then must be
communicated to decision-makers.These processes take time. By the time the feedback is
analyzed and in the hands of the decision-makers (i.e., captured), it is likely that the system
has changed.

Ambiguous Feedback
Another problem exists - ambiguous feedback, which results from the non-linear
nature of the system. Ambiguity poses a more serious problem for resource managers
because even if feedback can be captured, we may not know what the feedback means or

how to respond to it. Additionally, even when a rule appears to work well, it cannot be
assured that the rule will continue to have similarly favorable outcomes in the future. There
is simply always going to be a lot of uncertainty regarding the results of our actions
(Wilson, 2001). Given this, it goes without saying that we should try to adopt the most
precautionary and conservative policies - assuming that we know what they are.
In addition, as suggested earlier, the uncertainty created by ambiguous feedback
makes it difficult for users to develop conservation incentives. For example, a user only has
an incentive to restrain hisher activities today if they believe they will receive some benefits
of that restraint in the future. With the kind of uncertainty that exits in marine systems,
users cannot be assured that they will benefit for any conservation efforts that they make.
Similarly, the flows responsible for imperfect feedback discourage users from adopting
stewardship roles. This is because the boundaries of the resource (subsystems) are
permeable, and users are less likely to capture all of the benefits provided by their
conservation efforts. Institutions can be designed to create assurances for users that
encourage them to conserve the resource despite the uncertainties that discourage them
(Wilson, 2001). In addition, Wilson suggests that assigning broad rights will likely create
an environment where users have incentives to invest in the future, and thus adopt
conservation practices.

Responding to Feedback
Assuming that feedback can be captured and understood, decision-makers must also
be able to respond to the feedback. For example, feedback from the system may indicate
that one species is doing poorly and that users need to remove effort from that fishery and
switch either to a new location or to another fishery. It may be difficult for the user to adjust
if they need to switch fisheries. For example, it may be necessary for the user to re-rig their
vessel with another gear type in order to target a different species, which may be costly in
terms of both time and money. Switching fisheries may be prevented because of certain

license requirements. Legal boundaries may prevent the user from fishing for the same
species in a different area. Or, small vessels may not be equipped to travel long distances to
other fishing locations.
Additionally, if fishing experience indicates a need for a new rule, coming to an
agreement will likely take some time and negotiation. If a new rule is agreed upon, it must
be implemented which may involve long legal processes (e.g., through legislatures). Then

users must be informed and change their strategies to conform to the new rule. Local level
institutions are more likely to be capable of responding to changes in feedback than are
regional institutions because local level institutions are generally smaller and more
adaptable.
Another problem in responding to feedback involves how to interpret it. Analytical
errors can hinder our ability to respond appropriately to feedback. When interpreting
feedback, decision-makers use some form of model to determine what the feedback means
and what should be done. If, for example, feedback is analyzed with an imperfect model (or
with a flawed understanding of the system) the response may actually result in harm to the
resource. Additionally, we may know what kind of response is appropriate, but we may not
know how much response is adequate. For example, we may receive feedback that tells us
that there is an abundance of a particular species and we determine that the appropriate
response is to switch effort towards that species. In other words, it is possible for us to over
and under respond to feedback and we may never be able to know exactly how much effort
is appropriate.

Ln general, the problems we face in trying to respond to feedback are due to the
highly variable and complex nature of the system. When everything is changing rapidly, it is
difficult for us to know how to respond appropriately and quickly enough. If we hope to
sustain fishery resources, it is important that we organize the structure of fishing rights so
that we can maximize our abilities to capture and react appropriately to feedback from the
subsystems.

The Organization of Fishing
Traditionally, fishermen have adjusted to the variability in the system by utilizing
one of two fishing strategies. One strategy is for a vessel to target a single species across
multiple ecosystems. With the second strategy, fishermen target multiple species in a
relatively small geographic area. Considering these two strategies, there are two licensing
options available for managers. The first approach, based on conventional single species
economic theory, is to allocate rights to single species across systems (i.e., the Little Box
approach to management). The second is to allocate rights to multiple species within a welldefined area (i.e., the Big Box approach to management). These two ways to organize
fishing can be easily described in the context of hierarchy theory.

If there were no flows at all, when subsystems are perfectly decomposable, all
feedback can be captured within the subsystem. In this case, it makes sense to apply rules
at this scale. Still, if we assume linkages between subsystems are only minimal, more
feedback can be captured locally within the subsystem level than between subsystems. This
is because the intensity of interactions is greater within than between subsystems. Further,
even when flows are more than minimal, feedback loops are generally tighter at the local or
subsystem level than at the regional or system level and feedback is quicker at the local level
than the regional level (Levin, 1999).
This strongly implies that we may not get enough feedback when rules are focused
solely on individual species at the system (regional) level, such as with the conventional,
Little Box approach. The problem with focusing on individual species is that dynamics at
this scale are too variable and unpredictable, which makes feedback "noisy". The problem
with focusing solely at the regional level is that feedback is dissipated as it makes it way up
from the subsystem level to the system level, and consequently our ability to understand it is
diminished. Since more feedback can be captured at the subsystem level, the implication is
that we need to find an alternative to the large scale single species approach to management,

where harvesting rights are assigned to individual species and those species are managed
independently.
With this in mind, an attractive alternative approach is to adopt what users refer to as
a Big Box approach to management, where harvesting rights are allocated to multiple
species within a defined management area (which should correspond roughly with
subsystem boundaries). This approach is explored in the next chapter using an age
structured, multi-species bioeconornic model. Additionally, hierarchy theory suggests we
design institutions to parallel the multi-scale hierarchical structure of the marine system
(Wilson, 2001; Wilson, 1996). Each level in such a "parallel management structure" would
aim to capture feedback at a specific scale in the system. A "parallel management
structure" would be complimentary to a Big Box approach to management. In addition to
allowing us to capture the most feedback possible (i.e., from all scales in the system), this
approach would also enable us to capture the feedback that is lost through leaks between
levels (e.g., through migration).

Summary Chapter 1
The complex nature of the marine environment has made it very difficult for us to
manage the world's fisheries. We have to simplify the system, but hierarchy theory
suggests that the single species approach of conventional fisheries theory and practice may
be the wrong way. The result has been a nearly universal failure to protect the marine
environment and its resources. For successful management systems to evolve, we need to
learn what kinds of rules will result in sustainable resource use. This requires that we
receive feedback from the system. Complexity and hierarchy theory suggest that more
feedback can be captured by paying attention to subsystems rather than single species. This
is because there is generally more stability and predictability at the subsystem level than at
the species level in the system. Additionally, the interactions that occur within the
subsystem are tighter and quicker than the interactions that occur across subsystems. By

managing the system at the species level, it is unlikely that we can capture the kind of
feedback that we need. Therefore, in order to capture the most feedback from the system,
we need to move away from the purely large scale, single species approach to fisheries
management. New institutions are needed if we are to incorporate the complex behavior of
the system into fisheries management policies. These institutions need to parallel the multiscale hierarchical structure of marine ecosystems and provide incentives for users to invest
in an uncertain future. Unfortunately, feedback in highly variable complex systems is
imperfect and ambiguous. New alternatives need to be explored as we learn how to capture,
understand, and respond to feedback from the system.

CHAPTER 2:
EXPLORING IMPERFECT FEEDBACK UNDER TWO HARVESTING
MANAGEMENT REGIMES USING TWO AGE-STRUCTURED,
MULTISPECIES BIOECONOMIC MODELS
Introduction
As described in Chapter 1, marine ecosystems are highly variable, non-linear
systems characterized by complexity (e.g., Levin, 1999). This complexity creates many
problems for those seeking to manage marine resources (Ludwig et al, 1993; Dayton,
1998). Possibly the most important difficulty arises from the numerous levels of
uncertainty and predictability that exist in fisheries, both political and biological. This
uncertainty (I) makes it nearly impossible for decision-makers to learn how to make
meaningful management decisions (i.e., how to know if rules will result in sustainable
resource use) and (2) can create barriers against the development of conservation or
stewardship ethics (Wilson, 2001). In order to learn and minimize uncertainty in complex
marine systems, we must rely on feedback from the system (Holland, 1998; Ulanowicz,
1999; Wilson, 2001). Unfortunately, feedback in highly variable, non-linear complex
systems can be imperfect and ambiguous. Furthermore, even if feedback can be captured
and is understood, managers and users must be able to respond in a way that furthers their
objectives. Thus, understanding feedback in marine systems is essential if we are to create
sustainable management systems.

Two Perspectives for Dealing with System Variability
In complex marine systems, successful fishermen must know how and be able to
adapt to changes in the system (i.e., system variability). In order to deal with the variability
that exists in the system fishermen have generally utilized one of two fishing strategies. One
strategy is for a vessel to target a single species across multiple ecosystems. With the
second strategy, fishermen target multiple species in a relatively small geographic area.

A notable example of the first strategy is the U.S. redfish fishery that existed until
the 1980s (Arnes, pers. communication). These large vessels traveled from the Gulf of
Maine as far as Labrador, targeting local stocks of redfish. These vessels were able to react
to the variability of redfish in any particular area by always moving to areas of greater
abundance. That is, they relied on the stability in the average redfish biomass across
systems (in one area redfish biomass may be low, in another area redfish biomass may be
high - so the average is relatively stable). The Soviet fleets pursued a similar strategy on a
much larger scale. Because small boats cannot travel long distances, this strategy is more
suitable for large vessels. Additionally, this strategy is more economically feasible for large
vessels because they do not have to switch between multiple gear types. The forgone
fishing cost when the boat is in the yard is especially costly to large vessels, which is why
they prefer to target a single species or species complex.
An example of the second strategy is the traditional Maine inshore multi-species
fishing operation. These small vessels typically would target lobster in the spring and early
summer, groundfish in the summer, shrimp and scallop in the winter (Acheson, 1988). In
fact, inshore, small boat fishermen everywhere are known for switching from fishery to
fishery (or from species to species) as needed. Switching between fisheries allows them to
take advantage of market trends and changes in species abundance (Acheson, 1988). In
other words, this strategy deals with system variability by relying on the stability that arises
within the system. That is, although individual species populations may change from year to
year, there is always something in the system for these fishermen to harvest These small
boats are generally not able to move across multiple subsystems to chase individual species.
Only large vessels are capable of this migration. Additionally, switching between multiple
gear types is less costly for small boat operators because it can be done quicker. Therefore,
small boat fishermen generally prefer switching from fishery to fishery (or species to
species).

These two short-term strategies for dealing with system variability represent two
licensing options for managers and suggest two ways that we may be able to capture and
respond to feedback in the system. One approach is to allocate harvesting rights to a single
species throughout its range. This approach, known as the Little Box approach, is most
suitable for large vessels that are able to fish across multiple ecosystems. The second
option, known as the Big Box approach, is to allocate rights to multiple species within a
defined management area. This approach is more suitable for small vessels that must
remain in a relatively small geographic area. The recent trend in fisheries management,
which relies on conventional single species fisheries economics, has been towards the Little
Box approach to management.

Conventional, Single-Species, Little Box Perspective
The conventional perspective, which implies Little Box management, attempts to
capture feedback from the marine environment by focusing on individual species in
isolation. Because species-specific rights are allocated to users across systems and
subsystems and rules typically cover the entire range of a particular stock, local conditions
and processes (e.g., habitat, local stock structure, fish behavior) are essentially ignored.
The conventional perspective conceives the problem in a way that assumes that we
simply need to estimate the current size of the adult population in order to get sufficient
feedback from the system. This perspective assumes a simple balance between the growth
of the population (e.g., births and growth) and mortality (including fishing m ~ r t a l i t ~ ) . ~ '
This model (e.g., the Schaeffer model, Ricker model, and Beverton/Holt model) finds that
recruitment to the population is governed by the adult size of the population (e.g., spawning
stock biomass) and that the population will grow until it reaches its maximum size, which
assumes that there is an attainable equilibrium determined by a carrying capacity (Fig 1).

The variability that occurs in the population is considered to be due to changes in the adult
population and environmental "noise". Along these lines, the theory suggests that we can
get feedback by monitoring changes in the adult population (i.e., recruitment). It assumes
we can learn from this feedback and, by changing mortality due to fishing, can exercise
control over the population. Basically we can either increase or decrease fishing effort
(which will either increase or decrease the size of the population) and will know how the
population will respond (i.e., in terms of future recruitment).

Figure 1: Theoretical Stock-Recruitment Relationship

Recruitment

Spawning Stock Biomass

Fisheries economics recognizes the need for some sort of resource control or
property rights. In the absence of property rights, a situation referred to as open access,
feedback and learning do not take place. Consequently, profits are not maximized and the
resource is overexploited, a situation known as "the Tragedy of the Commons" (Hardin,

1968). This is due to the lack of individual incentives that encourage users to conserve the
resource. With no property rights, under open access fishing, users cannot be assured that
they will benefit in the future for any conservation efforts that they make today. With little
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Anderson (1986) provides a complete description of the conventional economic theory of fisheries

stake in the future of the resource, there is little incentive to learn, and so users to do not pay
attention to feedback in the system. Consequently, fisheries management seeks to create a
sole owner, which through exclusion, will bear all of the costs and enjoy all of the benefits
of the future condition of the resource. Loosely defined, the sole owner can take the form
of a collective body such as the government, a corporation, a co-op, or a community. A sole
owner is a theoretical construct that represents a single decision maker who is given all
rights to the resource. The sole owner bears all of the costs and enjoys all of the benefits of
conservation, and thus, has an incentive to learn how to harvest the resource in the most
sustainable manner in its efforts to maximize profits. Thus, the sole owner will be more
likely to pay attention to feedback in the system.
Based on the ecological assumptions described above (i.e., stock-recruitment
relationships), conventional economic theory utilizes effort-yield curves to describe the
amount of fish that the sole owner can take and still allow the stock to sustain its population
level. While biologists describe the largest amount that can be taken that will achieve
sustainability as the population's maximum sustainable yield (MSY), economists refer to
the greatest value fish that can be taken as the maximum economic yield (MEY). MEY is
the amount that a theoretical sole owner would remove from the system in order to
maximize profits and occurs at a population level higher and catch level lower than MSY.
With one decision-maker controlling the amount of effort in the fishery (i.e., the sole
owner), the feedback problem is greatly simplified. Theoretically, the sole-owner should
know exactly how much effort it is using and can more quickly change its effort levels
according to changes in stock size.
There are many important assumptions underlying this perspective that may over
simplify feedback problem in marine systems. First of all, this theory assumes that we can
capture perfect, or at least very good, feedback from the system by simply looking at
changes in the size of the adult population relative to fishing. It assumes that we know what
-

-

-

management.
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the feedback means (i.e., that it is not ambiguous). With this theory, we know that in a
population of X size, recruitment will be Y. Thirdly, it assumes that we can respond
appropriately to the feedback by simply changing levels of fishing effort. This perspective
requires that we know what impact we are having on the system (i.e., what our effort levels
are and what they mean) and requires that we can accurately estimate population sizes.

In reality, however, marine systems are complex and feedback is difficult to capture,
ambiguous, and difficult to respond to. Although examples do exist where fish populations
have recovered after the cessation of fishing (e.g., the recovery of fish stocks during world
wars), there have also been instances where the result was not as the conventional, singlespecies theory would have predicted. Mike Sinclair, a scientist at the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans in Canada, recently described the concern over unexpected increases
in young cod death rates that have occurred since a moratorium was imposed on the species
in the early 1 9 9 0 s . ~Considering
~
the single species models and a 10-year suspension of
harvesting activities, one would expect that the cod resource would have recovered by now.
However, this has not been the case. Another notable example occurred in New England.
When spawning area closures were implemented to protect the groundfish resource on
Georges Bank in 1994, the expectation was that the groundfish stocks would recover with
the removal of fishing pressures. However, 5 years after these areas were closed to fishing,
the result was not the recovery of the groundfish populations, but a booming scallop
population (Murawski et. al, 2000). A third example is illustrated by the loss of the inshore
cod and haddock stocks in the Gulf of Maine (Arnes, 1997). Although, harvesting pressures
were removed on the inshore stocks in the 1960s, the stocks have not since recovered.
These examples illustrate the complicated causality in complex marine systems and the high
probability that simply changing levels of fishing effort cannot achieve sustainability.
This raises an important question: If the source of variability in fish populations is
not due solely to changes in the size of the adult populations, then does the conventional
22
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single-species approach oversimplify the feedback problem? Put another way, if stockrecruitment relationships do not exist, can we get sufficient feedback from the system by
looking solely at individual species across systems (i.e., using a Little Box approach to
management)? Or, is it necessary to take some form of non-species specific approach to
management?

An Ecosystem Perspect h e

An alternative view, which implies a Big Box management approach, considers the
system as being composed of patchily distributed subsystems and as having both spatial
and temporal heterogeneity. This perspective assumes a hierarchically organized complex
system, as described by Simon (1962) and O'Neill et al. (1986).~~
This view recognizes the
importance of the interactions that occur between species and between species and their
environments. Furthermore, this view assumes a non-equilibrium based, dynamic system
characterized by high levels of variability and non-linearity.
Nevertheless, there is an important form of stability found in these systems.
Multiple subsystems create redundancy, which provide resilience for the system and for the
species that occupy the system (Simon, 1962; Levin, 1999). This redundancy makes marine
systems relatively resilient to perturbations disturbance^).'^ For example, if one area
experiences a disturbance (e.g., from a storm) that results in zero settlement of one species,
then it is possible that individuals of that same species from an adjacent area will be able to
re-colonize that area (Holling, 1973). This is consistent with metapopulation theory (e.g.,
Hanski and Gilpin, 1997). In addition, another type of redundancy, resulting from species
diversity within functional groups, may also result in subsystem stability (e.g., Peterson et
al, 1998; Jackson et al, 2001). With the loss of one species there is likely another within that
functional group in that subsystem that performs the same, or nearly the same, function
(allowing the system or subsystem as a whole to function as always (e.g., Steneck, 2001).
l3

See also Chapter 1.

Additionally, interactions among the components (i.e., species) of the subsystem provide
stability through post-settlement (pre-recruitment) regulation. The most significant of these
interactions occur during species early life stages2'
Compensation among species is another strong attribute of these systems. The fact
that systems are food or energy limited suggests that when the population of one species
increases, another species' population must decline since energy will not exist to completely
support it. This is due to niche overlap. That is, with the removal of even one individual,
there is "room" in the system for another. Similarly, when one species is reduced or
removed, another may be able to take its place. How a species reacts to changes in the
system is a function of their intrinsic characteristics (e.g., fast growing and short lived or
slow growing and long lived). We use the word compensation to refer to the growth of a
population as a result of the decline in another. The result of compensation is that although
individual species populations are highly variable, there is relative stability of biomass at the
system level (e.g., Laevastu and Hayes, 1981, Levin, 1999).
There are several notable examples that illustrate compensation in the Gulf of Maine
region. It has been suggested that compensation, resulting from community predation, may
explain the recent growth in the abundance of elasmobranchs (e.g., dogfish and skates) on
Georges Bank that has occurred since the depletion of the groundfish populations (Fogarty
and Murawski, 1998). Diet overlap could explain why the elasmobranchs were able to
increase after the decline in the groundfish populations (i.e., due to a release from
competition). Similarly, another example often noted is when sand lance populations
increased dramatically with the decline in herring and mackerel populations in the 1960s
(Sissenwine, 1984). Populations of herring and mackerel were subsequently able to recover
to historical levels, perhaps since these species feed on post-larval and juvenile sand lance.

In coastal regions of the Gulf of Maine, the once abundant large finfish predator species
This does not mean, however, that the system will rebound back to a single equilibrium condition.
One example of such an interaction that occurs at early life stages is predation - or the tendency of big
fish to eat little fish (Sissenwine (1984).
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(e.g., cod, haddock) are now considered to be ecologically extinct. Consequently, the region
is now largely dominated by commercially less important species (e.g., sculpins, dogfish,
skates) and several invertebrate species (e.g., lobster, crabs, urchins) have also increased in
abundance (Steneck, 1997).
This perspective attempts to simplify the complexity (and variability) in the system
by focusing on the stability that arises within the system. That is, this approach assumes that
the variability of populations is due to what is happening within the system (e-g., with
interactions between species and their environment), and so does not assume a stockrecruitment relationship. Although the various components of the system (e.g., species)
fluctuate unpredictably, they do so within a general range and the system as a whole is
generally stable. This approach assumes that most of the feedback from our actions will be
contained within the system, and so we should look towards the system level as we try to
capture and respond to feedback. Additionally, it assumes that we can capture more
feedback by looking at the system level where dynamics are more stable compared to the
dynamics that occur at the species dimension (where "noise" makes it difficult to perceive
feedback).

Summary and Hypothesis
Thus, there are essentially two different perspectives on how to deal with complexity
in marine systems. One view, the conventional approach, tries to simplify the system by
focusing on the individual species populations. A second approach attempts to simplify the
system by focusing on hierarchical structure and the stability that exists at the system level.
Each perspective on how to deal with complexity suggests the need for a different approach
to fisheries management. The first approach implies harvesting rights to species across
systems (the conventional single species approach, or the "Little Box" approach). The

second approach implies rights to multiple species within a system (the "Big BOX"
approach).26
It is hypothesized that if there is more stability at the system level (and that
variability in species populations is due to constraints imposed on the species by system
factors) compared to the variability and "noise" in the species dimension, then the Big Box
approach to harvesting will allow for better use of feedback in the system (i.e., that more
feedback can be captured and harvesters can respond better to that feedback without having
to deal with as much "noise") compared to the Little Box approach to harvesting. This
hypothesis will be explored using two age-structured, multi-species bioeconomic models. In
particular, the models are used to explore the conditions under which appropriate feedback
can be captured (and responded to) in highly variable complex marine systems.

Two Bioeconomic Models of A Complex Marine System
Modeling is a useful tool that allows us to think through what we think we know
about the system and helps us realize what we do not know. Hannon and Ruth (1997)
describe the "art of modeling" as an extension of our thinking and as a learning tool.

Throughout our life we have learned to develop models in our
minds of the processes that we face everyday. We do solve an
amazing class of dynamic problems, such as hitting baseballs
and driving cars, by acquiring through trial and error the skills
that are necessary to put the various components of a dynamic
system together in our mind, draw the necessary conclusions,
and react accordingly. However, the more complex the system,
the less we are able to sufficiently grasp in our mind its workings
and to prepare our actions. We simply cannot hold the many aspects
of a dynamic process in mind at once. We need to be able to capture
our knowledge, possibly that of others, in a consistent and transparent
way so that we can better understand, and act in, a changing world.
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Given the complex nature of the marine system, modeling should be viewed as an important
tool with which to explore the way we conceptualize the system. Further, modeling can yield
insight into how our actions will influence system dynamics.

In order to explore the dynamics of a multispecies fishery and the implications of
the two management approaches previously described, two age-structured, multiple species
models were created using the graphical programming language STELLA 6.0.27
These models were designed for the purpose of exploring the ideas previously
presented. These models were not designed to be predictive and do not exactly replicate
what happens in the real world (e.g., the Gulf of Maine). That was not the intention. The
intention was to create tractable models that qualitatively depict the dynamics of a basic
complex marine system. The purpose was to use the models to explore and extend logically
our conception of complex marine systems.

Description of the Models
Both models are complex and function similarly to ones used by Wilson et al.
(1991) and Wilson et al. (1999). One model simulates the conventional single species
approach to management (or the Little Box model) and the other replicates a multispecies
system approach to management (or the Big Box model). Each model consists of two
biological sectors, representing two geographically proximate multispecies systems, and an
economic sector that governs harvesting acti~ities.~'

Overview of the System
Both models view the system as complex and dynamic. The two systems are
considered local but may be connected by larval drift or migration.29

-

The models were created through a joint effort between Dr. J.A.Wilson, D.F. Gilbert, and the author.
The biological sector was adapted from the FORTRAN Model used by Wilson et. a1 1991.
29 NO larval drift or migration was included for the purposes of this thesis.

27
28

Two ecological characteristics of the model are important to specify. They are (1)
the differentiation of the species and (2) a system biomass constraint. The species were
intentionally differentiated to account for the diversity of species that exist in real world
systems. Despite this differentiation, the species still occupy overlapping niches. The
system biomass constraint is included to represent the system's energy budget, or canying
capacity.30The system is tight and energy efficient. It is assumed that primary production
is efficiently converted to fish production and the system is considered to be food limited.
Two important properties emerge as a result of these characteristics. These
properties are believed typical of multiple species systems. The first property is relative
dynamic stability of the overall biomass of the system with highly variable, unpredictable
component populations (e.g., Simon, 1969; May et. al, 1979; Laevastu and Hayes, 1981,
Sissenwine 1984; O'Neill, 1986; Murawski and Idoine, 1992; Fogarty and Murawski,
1998). The second property is compensation (due here to density-dependent non-species
specific negative feedback at the larval and post-larval stage of the species life) (e.g.,
Sissenwine, 1984; May et. al, 1979; Mayo et. al, 1992; Levin, 1999).
The Systems
Each biological sector is similar and contains five age-structured populations. These
species represent one functional group (or trophic level). These populations have been
labeled, for convenience only, "herring", "cod", "haddock", "redfish", and "sand
lance". These species should not be confused with the species found in any real world
ecosystem. The species were loosely modeled after several species found in the Gulf of
MaineIGeorges Bank region.31However, it was necessary to slightly alter some aspects of
the species life history characteristics in order to differentiate them. Differentiation of the
species was necessary to represent the diversity of species that exists in real world
ecosystems. Additionally, without differentiation, the mddel will either not keep each
For the purposes of this paper, the subsystems in each model are given identical carrying capacities.
Weight at age data were taken from Ruth and Lindholm (1996), Holland (2000), and Northeast Fisheries
Science Center (1998).
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species extant or depicts the species in synchronous periodicity. Both of these behaviors do
not realistically reflect real world population dynamics. The species are differentiated on the
basis of weight-at-age attributes, age of maturity, fecudity, natural mortality, and age of
recruitment to the fishery. Species longevity is reflected in the natural morality rate, which
means that species with a higher natural morality rate are shorter-lived species. All species
were given natural mortality rates from 18%to 25%. Each species enters the fishery at the
same age that it becomes sexually mature. Additionally, at age 0 and age 1 the mortality of
each species is differentially influenced by density dependent constraints resulting from the
system carrying capacity (stated in terms of the biomass of all species).
As noted, the species were differentiated to appropriately represent the diversity
found in real world systems. The principle underlying the differentiation used here is that
species differ in fundamental ways and those differences can be thought of as lying on a
continua from "r-selected" to "K-selected" life history strategies. Although this concept
does not account for all aspects of species life history strategies, "it is a useful paradigm of
the reality of qualitatively different kinds of strategies" (Apollonio, 1994). Species
exhibiting "r-selected" strategies are characterized as opportunistic while "K-selected"
species are described as equilibrium or competitor efficient species. Although the species
are differentiated, it is assumed that there is significant niche overlap.
The S-pies
"Sand lance" and "herring" can be considered to lie towards the "r-selected" end
of the spectrum. These two are the most short-lived of all the species in the model. "Sand
lance" represents a "bloom" species that is capable of quickly taking advantage of unused
energy (e.g., food) in the system. "Sand lance" becomes mature at age 2. This species is
not harvested and represents the untouched biomass that is present in most marine
ecosystems. Because it is not harvested and is the most fecund of all the species in the
system, "sand lance" can dominate the system when everything else is heavily fished. This

allows overfishing with relative biomass stability. "Herring" is also a light, fast growing,
and relatively fecund species. "Herring" reaches sexual maturity at age three.
"Cod" and "haddock could be thought as lying somewhere in the middle of the
continua. "Cod" grows fast and large and is very fecund. It has an intermediate life span,
compared to the other species. "Haddock" has a shorter life span (higher natural mortality
rate) and is less fecund than "cod". Both species reach sexual maturity at age 4.
"Redfish" is characteristic of a "K-selected" species. It is a long-lived
(experiences relatively low natural mortality) and slow growing species. This species
reaches maturity later than the other species (age 7) and is assumed to invest more energy
into ensuring the survival of its young. Therefore, it produces comparatively fewer eggs that
are less susceptible pre-recruitment mortality.
Changes in the population size of each species are determined by species specific
density-dependentegg survival rates, natural mortality, and fishing induced mortality. A
density-dependent mortality rate controls the number of eggs that survive to age 1 and is a
function of the total size of the species population. Due to the high levels of interactions
between these species, the populations are very sensitive to changes in the number of births
and natural mortality rates. Additionally, the species in the system are also constrained by a
system carrying capacity. The canying capacity represents the total biomass that the system
can maintain. As the total biomass of the system nears the carrying capacity, the individual
species experience additional mortality on age 0 and age 1 classes. Survival of age 1 fish is
also influenced by an additional density-independent mortality that serves to further
differentiate the species and allow for compensation. This mortality is randomly generated
but extends over a wide-range (producing greater variability) for "sand lance" and
"herring" and less variability for "redfish".
The Economic Sectors
The economic sectors of the two models differ substantially. In both models, four of
the five species in the system are harvested and decisions are made on the basis of
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profitability. In the first model, the Little Box model, fishing rights are allocated on a single
species basis. Fishing occurs across the two systems and each boat is restricted to a single
species. In this model, current profits per boat are compared between systems and a
proportion of the vessels will migrate towards the most profitable system. In the second
model, the Big Box model, fishing rights are allocated within one system and vessels are
allowed to switch between species. In this model, individual vessels compare the relative
profitability between fishing for the currently targeted species and the profitability of fishing
for each of the other species, and move to the species where profitability is greater. Two
ownership regimes are modeled, open access and sole ownership.32
The sole owner is an analytical construct used in resource economics. It implicitly
assumes away all the problems of organization, internal transactions costs, monitoring
problems, accountability, and most of all, individual incentives within an organization. The
sole owner rule assumes a single decision-maker that "owns" all of the boats. It has access
to all relevant information (e.g., biomass levels) with which it determines how to best
allocate effort each year. With the profit maximizing sole owner, decisions regarding
whether to add or subtract vessels are based on the results of a search process that compares
the owner's past decisions to add or subtract boats, with the results of those decisions (i.e.,
whether they were profitable or not).
The model assumes that harvesters do not have problems finding alternative forms
of employment and that no regulatory barriers exist to impede entry. It is assumed that
boats can be bought or leased and are immediately able to enter the fishery. The model also
assumes that capital is perfectly fungible. Thus, there are no delays in entry and exit.
Similarly, it is assumed that there is no cost associated with switching fisheries (e.g., with
switching gear types).

'' Under open access there are no barriers to entry and exit (e.g., in the form of a license requirement). Entry
occurs when average profits are positive and exit occurs when average profits are negative. When no profits
occur, no entry or exit occurs. Since open access assumes there are no barriers to entry and exit (e.g.,
restricting vessels to a fishery), open access is run only with the Big Box model.

In a simple non-age-structured single species model, the system provides immediate
feedback to the sole owner, implying a rapid ability to learn. In this model, feedback is
delayed because the action of the sole owner needs a chance to work its way through the
system. It may be a few years before the sole owner knows what kind of impact its decision
has had on the system.33 Additionally, in this model, intervening events can generate
"noise" in the feedback that the sole owner uses to make it decisions. In the Big Box for
example, while the sole owner sees an abundance of "cod and begins to direct effort to
that species, there may be a bloom in "herring" that causes the system constraint to be
exceeded, which consequently induces a high level of mortality on young "cod" (age 0 and

I), which is not seen by the sole owner for a few years. The increase in "herring" may
signal to the sole owner that profits are high and the sole owner may add more boats to the
system. When the sole owner "realizes" what happened to the "cod" population, it may
not be able to move effort out of that fishery quickly enough.
In order to differentiate population signals from the system noise, resulting from the
variability of the populations, the sole owner bases its decisions on a 5-year trend
However, in one of the early versions of the model this noise led to the sole owner finding a
local sub-optimum instead of finding the profit maximizing solution. Therefore, the sole
owner was given a "memory" of past circumstances that lead to high profits. The sole
owner "remembers" the ratio of biomass to boats that existed at times of high profits and
adds and subtracts boats in order to move towards those profitable circumstances. This
gives the sole owner a more "global" perspective that avoids local optima. Additionally, the
sole owner considers alternative sources of income that could be gained outside of fishing.
It does this by comparing the average profits per boat with an arbitrarily set "floor" which
represents the income that could be generated by a unit of effort outside of fishing. When
the average profits per boat fall below the "floor" the sole owner removes a portion of its
boats from the fishery.
-
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Due to the delays and noise, the sole owner cannot find the profit maximizing solutions by looking for
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As noted earlier, switching in both models is done on the basis of profitability. In
the Little Box model, the sole owner looks at the relative profitability between harvesting the
species in one system versus harvesting that same species in the other system, and boats will
migrate towards the more profitable system. For example, the profitability of fishing for
"herring" one system vs. fishing for "herring" in the other system is compared, and the
sole owner will move a portion of the boats to the most profitable system. In the Big Box
model, the relative profitability of each species is compared and the sole owner reallocates
effort to increase profitability. This does not, however, mean that the sole owner will move
all of its effort to the most profitable fishery. This is prevented by limiting the amount of
effort that can be relocated during a given year (i.e., the switch rate).
Profitability is calculated as total revenue generated minus the total costs. Revenue
is simply the total catch (pounds harvested) multiplied by the price per pound. Prices for all
species were held constant, as it was assumed that the fishery was operating in the context
of a world market. Catch is a function of the number of boats, the available harvestable
biomass, and the vessel's efficiency. Total costs are a function of the number of boats and
the operation costs per vessel. In order to more easily interpret model results, prices,
operational costs, and harvesting efficiencies were kept constant and the same for all four
harvested species. This effectively eliminates noise that would otherwise be generated by
variations in these economic variables. Also, it creates a direct link between profits and
species or system biomass. Hence, monitoring changes in species or system profits is
equivalent to monitoring species or system biomass.

the 1~12"derivatives, as can be done with analytical single species models.

CHAPTER 3:
RESULTS OF THE MODELS
Restatement of the Hypothesis
The models were created with the intention of simulating a hierarchically organized
complex marine system composed of two subsystems, each constrained by a local carrying
capacity. Specifically, the models were created with the intention of exploring how feedback
can enable learning in complex marine ecosystems. Feedback can be defined as "influence
on a system component mediated by changes induced by that component" (Levin, 1999).
The process of learning involves first observing changes in the system and then trying to
discern the results of those changes (i.e., feedback). However, the complex nature of the
system makes capturing and understanding feedback difficult.
Complexity and hierarchy theory suggest that because subsystems are more stable
than the individual populations that comprise them, better feedback can be gained by
looking at changes in the average biomass in the system (i.e., at the subsystem level) than by
observing changes in individual populations. The stability of the average biomass (i.e., the
subsystem level) is due to constraints imposed by a system carrying capacity (e.g., energy
limitation). Within these subsystems, compensation between species occurs due to
competition among functionally similar species for available space. The result is that
although the composition of species within the subsystem can change rapidly, the average
sum biomass of the species is relatively stable.
Given this stability, feedback is less "noisy" at the subsystem level compared to the
species level. This means that feedback will be easier to observe and less ambiguous at the
subsystem level. In other words, at the species level in the system where dynamics are
highly variable (more "noisy"), it is more difficult to capture, understand, and adapt to
feedback. This suggests that more learning and adaptation can take place if rights are

allocated to harvest multiple species within a subsystem than if rights are allocated to harvest
individual species across subsystems. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the Big Box model
will produce more favorable results than the Little Box model.

Evaluating the Model
Due to the complexity of the models, testing the hypothesis requires breaking up the
feedback problem into multiple components and looking for patterns in the results of the
models. The feedback problem can be divided into three components. The first problem is
capturing the feedback. The second problem requires an understanding of that feedback
(e.g., distinguishing signals from noises). And the third problem is being able to respond to
feedback.
The initial design of the model minimized all three components of the feedback
problem. The sole owner under the baseline model is assumed to have perfect information
about the biological and economic status of the resources, but not causality. Additionally,
the sole owner knows how to and is able to adapt to that information immediately (e.g., there
are no decision lags, no barriers to entry and exit, no costs associated with moving its fleet
around, etc.). Starting with these "perfect" conditions, the model is then altered to better
explore the feedback problem. This is done in a variety of ways but essentially involves (1)
impairing the quality of feedback received by the sole owner and (2) hindering the sole
owner's ability to adapt to changes in the system. The purpose was to observe how well the
sole owner is able to respond to feedback in a variety of conditions with the hope of seeing
patterns in the observed results.
Given the complexity of the feedback problem and the models used, no single
indicator in the model quantifies how much feedback is captured and used by the sole
owner. Feedback use is reflected in how the resource is exploited. One can assume that the
better the quality of feedback and the better individuals are able to adapt to feedback (and
changes in the system), the more efficiently the resources are harvested. This means that use

of the resources becomes more economically and ecologically sustainable. It is assumed
that profits signal to the users what is happening with the biological status of the resource.
This is because profits are a linear function of the amount of harvestable biomass available.
With little or no (or poor) feedback getting to the sole owner, one would assume that
harvesting of resources would be done less efficiently.
Again, due to the complexity of the models and the nature of the feedback problem,
both economic and biological indicators were relied on to assess the harvesting efficiency of
the two models. Looking at multiple indicators provides a better opportunity to see patterns
in the observed results.
Wealth, or accumulated profits, is viewed as the most important indicator used to
evaluate the two models. Since profits are indirectly a function of the harvestable biomass
available, wealth is also an indicator of the health of the resource. The purpose of the other
indicators was to aid in our interpretation of the observations that we see in wealth (i.e., to
check for noises). The other indicators reported were catch (biomass harvested), spawning
stock biomass (mature biomass), system biomass (ages 2 and

and fleet size.

Running the models
The model reports annually the results of the year's harvesting activity. The species
composition of the biomass in the subsystem changes each year due to the harvest and
changes in the system constraint. The result is that catch is different each year for each
species, and consequently so is wealth. Looking at one year will not provide much feedback
about a given simulation. Therefore, in order to evaluate the model it was necessary to
generate an average over multiple years. The model was run for 500 years and averages
were then calculated for the last 400 years of each 500-year run. The first 100 years of each
run were ignored to allow the model to adjust to initial conditions. Each time the model is
run (i.e., a 500-yr run) the random component on age 1 mortality results in a different 400year average. It was therefore also necessary to generate another average (of multiple
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System biomass (ages 2 and up) reflects the population surviving post-settlement mortality.

runs). Therefore, under each simulation, the models were run 50 times for 500-year
intervals. The 400-year averages (ignoring the first 100 years) were then averaged for the
50 runs. Averages for all simulations are summarized in the Appendices.

Consistency Tests
Before the models were used to explore the hypothesis, they were tested for
reliability. A number of tests were done to make sure that the dynamics observed in the
model conformed to expectations. These tests include dynamics of the populations in the
absence of harvesting, the response of the species to exploitation, and the implications of the
kind of harvesting regime on the status of the resource. A final test was done to make sure
that the only difference between the two models is the kind of property rights regime
constraining the sole owner. As shown below, the models respond as expected.

System Dynamics Under No Harvesting
With no harvesting, the species are variable and exhibit compensation. However the
overall biomass of the system is stable (Fig 2). The system can be considered energy
efficient, as the total biomass of the system is stable and the individual populations act as if
they are food or energy limited. When no fishing occurs, "cod" and "redfish" dominate
the system. This makes sense because these are the most long-lived of the species in the
models (with the lowest natural mortality rates). These results represent what we might
expect in an unfished system.

Figure 2: System Biomass (ages 2 and up) under
No Harvesting
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System Dynamics Under Two Ownership Regimes
Two ownership regimes typically described in economics are modeled; open access
and sole ownership.35According to economic theory, because no property rights exist
under open access uncoordinated entry takes place fishery until profits are zero. The result
is overcapitalization in the fishery (too many boats) and, given sufficient demand, the
"inevitable" overexploitation of resources. Under sole ownership, property rights are
assigned to a single, profit-maximizing decision-maker who has an incentive to invest in the
future of the fishery. According to economic theory, the sole owner is able to maximize
profits and sustainable use of the resources occurs.
When the model is run, first under open access and then with a sole owner, it
responds as expected from economic theory. The biomass of the individual species is
reduced and the populations are substantially more variable than was observed under no
harvesting (Fig 3). The biomass at the system level remains more stable than the biomass at
the species level. The system biomass is also more variable compared to the system in the
unfished state (Fig 2,3). Compensation between species can also be seen under harvesting
conditions. Under open access fishing conditions, "sand lance" (the unfished species)
clearly dominates the system, while the remaining species are now at similar biomass levels
(Fig 3). However, "cod" slightly dominates among the fished species.
Under sole ownership, "sand lance" no longer dominates the system and all
species are at similar biomass levels (Fig 4). Since under open access "sand lance"
dominates the system and under sole ownership "sand lance" does not dominate the
system, the model conforms to traditional economic theory. Traditional theory says that in
the absence of property rights (open access) resources are overexploited. The theory further
suggests property rights (sole ownership) provide incentives that lead to sustainable use of
resources. The dominance of "sand lance" in open access suggests that the resources have
Open access is only modeled with the Big Box model because the Little Box model assumes that there is
some barrier (i.e., license restriction) limiting a vessel to fishing a single species. Open access assumes no
barriers to entry and exit.
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Figure 3: System Biomass (ages 2 and up) under Open Access Fishing
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Figure 4: System Biomass (ages 2 and up) under Sole Ownership
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been overexploited, otherwise there would not be so much "room" for "sand lance" to
dominate. Therefore, the dynamics of the species under the two property rights regimes
provide confidence in the models.

Open Access vs. Sole Ownership
Further exploration of open access and sole ownership provided additional
confidence in the model. As expected, open access management reduced harvested stocks
to low levels and captured zero profits. With results consistent with theory, decisionmaking by a sole owner (under Big Box fishing), was economically and biologically
superior to open access management (Tablel). The amount of wealth generated in the open
access regime was significantly less compared with the wealth generated under the sole
owner in the Big Box model (Table 1).36 Average mature biomass was significantly less
under open access (Table 1). Average biomass (ages 2 and up) was also significantly less
in open access (Fig 3d). However, "sand lance" biomass (ages 2 and up) dominated the
open access system (Table 1). This makes sense because "sand lance" represents the
untouched biomass in the system and is able to take up the space made available when the
other species are fished. Average catch and fleet size in open access were greater than that
seen under sole ownership (Table 1). In general, the result of open access is a depleted
system largely dominated by the unharvested species ("sand lance").

In addition, the model responded as expected to changes in prices and operating
costs under open access and sole ownership. For example, under open access, increased
prices led to decreased biomass and consequently decreased wealth. Under sole ownership,
the model resulted in a slightly greater harvest, increased wealth, and a slight decrease in
biomass. Decreasing operating costs generated the same results as increased prices.

The wealth that does occur in open access is due to a delayed response to population blooms. When a
bloom occurs, the resource is exploited by the boats in the fishery at the time of the bloom (resulting in
profits being generated). Eventually "everyone else" responds, raising costs and ultimately driving profits
to zero.
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Table 1: Sole Ownership vs. Open Access
Sole Owner

Open Access

C Wealth
Ha Wealth
He Wealth

7,190,082
3,819,098
2,844,946

141,639 50
166,913 50
161,190 50

737,904
347,318
857,739

40,482 100
23,800 100
102,465 100

C Catch
Ha Catch
He Catch
R Catch
M a e e Bi
C Mat Bio
Ha Mat Bio
He Mat Bio
R Mat Bio

1,034,233
603,832
472,912
216,811

14,751 50
36,758 50
36,011 50
4,128 50

1,089,846
744,856
870,958
141

13,957 100
12,451 100
24,132 100
161 100

1,786,390
1,474,734
1,361,465
1,045,789

95,732 50
54,901 50
43,611 50
64,293 50

1,089,846
744,856
870,958
282

13,957 100
12,451 100
24,132 100
337 100

27 50
26 50
9 50

987
1,095
352

12 100
21 100
13 100

74,632 50
32,800 50
27,471 50
95,249 50
173,492 50

2,694,464
2,002,674
1,606,312
854
6,681,766

34,753 100
33,168 100
44,336 100
1,007 100
47,664 100

Ha Fleet
He Fleet
R Fleet
C Bio
Ha Bio
He Bio
R Bio
S1 Bio

277
236
141
3,213,549
2,652,404
1,822,274
2,180,259
3,559,502

Averages are for the last 400-years of N runs

These results are consistent with economic theory and provide confidence in the
model. The results find that sole ownership is superior to open access, which is consistent
with the theory of open access, also known as the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin,
1968). This theory says that under open access resources are overexploited and profits are
not maximized, both of which were observed in the model.
Given the advantages of sole ownership, the remainder of the thesis explores the
conditions under which sole ownership can capture and respond most appropriately to
feedback in the system. Specifically, the question explored is whether we should look for
feedback at the system level (e.g., using the Big Box approach) or the species level (e.g.,
using the Little Box approach).

Big Box vs. Little Box Under Identical Harvesting Pressures
One final test was done to make sure that there were no differences in the biological
sectors of the two models (i.e., that each model responded the same to identical conditions).
When all fisheries (i.e., species) in the Big Box and Little Box models experienced the same
harvesting pressures under sole ownership, the results of the models were statistically
equivalent (Table 2). Harvesting pressures were kept the same by preventing switching and
entry and exit. These results were expected and confirm that the biological sectors and
general fishery characteristics are identical between models. Therefore, as different
harvesting scenarios (with entrylexit and switching) are explored, any differences between
models must be due to differences in the two harvesting regimes (i.e., Big Box vs. Little
Box management).

Baseline Conditions of Sole Ownership: Big Box vs. Little Box
Results of Baseline
Under baseline conditions, the two models differ only slightly (Table 3). Although
average total wealth (accumulated profits) is slightly higher in the Big Box (Table 3), the
standard deviations of the means overlap. However, the Little Box actually does better in the
"cod" fishery (Table 3). Similarly, average mature biomass is slightly greater in the Little
Box - with more mature biomass in the "cod", "redfish", and "herring" populations in
that model (Table 3). The Big Box model resulted in a higher average mature biomass in the
"haddock and "sand lance" populations compared to the Little Box model (Table 3).
Similarly, system biomass (ages 2+) is also only slightly greater in the Little Box
compared to the Big Box (Table 3). System biomass in the "cod", "redfish", and
herring" populations were greater in the Little Box, while "haddock and "sand lance"
were greater in the Big Box model (Table 3). Average catch is slightly higher in the Big
Box, in all fisheries besides "redfish" (Table 3). The number of boats in the Big Box
model is also slightly higher compared to the Little Box model (Table 3).

Table 2: Big Box vs. Little Box under Identical Harvesting Effort
Big Box

Ha Wealth
He Wealth
R Wealth

4,300,887
2,874,350
768.075

ILittle Box

110,504 50
51,430 50
51.960 50

C Catch
Ha Catch
He Catch
R Catch
Mature Bio
C Mat Bio
Ha Mat Bio
He Mat Bio
R Mat Bio

Ha Fleet
He Fleet
R Fleet
$ystem Bio
C Bio
Ha Bio
He Bio
R Bio
S1 Bio
Averages are for the last 400-years of N runs

4,284,761
2,876,781
755.949

97,513 50
64,059 50
54.220 50

Table 3: Big Box vs. Little Box under Baseline Conditions

Ha Wealth
He Wealth

Ha Catch

He Mat Bio
R Mat Bio

Averages are for the last 400-years of N runs

Variability Under Baseline Conditions
Inter-annual changes in recruitment were used as the indicator of variability (Table
4). Recruitment here is defined as entry into the harvestable population, except for "sand
lance" for which recruitment is entry into the "adult" population. Table 4 shows the
average inter-annual variability in the baseline models for each species in one system and
for recruitment into harvestable population of one system. Variability in each system is
nearly identical.

Table 4: Average Percent Change in Recruitment by Species
Big Box
Ave

Stdev

Little
Box
Ave

Stdev

N

Averages are for the last 400-years of N runs
Recruitment is more variable at the species level in the system than at the system
level (i.e., harvestable recruitment) except for "redfish". This means that in trying to
capture feedback from the system37,the Big Box sole owner is dealing with "less"
variability (at least compared to the Little Box "cod", "herring", and "haddock"
fisheries). This may be one reason why the Big Box sole owner average total profits were
slightly greater compared to the Little Box sole owner.
One would expect the Little Box to do better in the "redfish" fishery because the
"redfish" population is very stable. However, the slow growing nature of "redfish" makes
it very relatively easy to fish this species down. This is because this species is less resilient
to fishing and if the sole owner overshoots its effort in one year, this species will take longer

to recover compared to the other species. The "herring" and "haddock fisheries are
more variable, which is why the Little Box sole owner may have had a more difficult time in
these fisheries, compared to the "cod" fishery. It is possible that the Little Box sole owner
does well in "cod" because it is not too variable and is fast growing - which means it is
more resilient to fishing. It is likely that the Big Box sole owner did not do as well
(compared to the Little Box) in the " c o d fishery because by focusing on the average
harvestable biomass (as an aggregate) it is not able to take advantage of the species
individual stability and fast growth.
Unfortunately, we could not explore questions of high levels of variability with this
model. We found that increasing variability was impossible without killing off one or more
of the harvested species. In particular, "redfish was very sensitive to changes in variability.
This is because this species is very slow growing and thus less resilient. Because the
species exhibit compensation, an "unusual" increase in one species reduces the space
available for other species. "Redfish cannot easily take advantage of openings in the
system and so is often eliminated by consecutive growth "spurts" of other populations.

Sole Owner Response to Impaired Feedback
In the baseline, the feedback problem faced by the sole owner is minimal. The sole
owner is assumed to have perfect knowledge of the biological and the economic conditions
of the resource. It receives accurate information, which it is then able to analyze and use to
make a decision in a timely manner. This means that economic and biological data are up to
date and without flaw. The sole owner is further able to implement that decision
immediately. That is, it adds or removes boats or switches fisheries as soon as it makes its
decision. This further means that users (employees of the sole owner, members of the
cooperative, etc.) are made aware of the new rules and are expected to change their
37 The sole owner

looks at changes in profits for feedback. Since prices, costs, and harvesting efficiencies

harvesting strategies in a moment's notice. In addition, there is no cost associated with
entering and exiting the fishery.
This is obviously not realistic of what could happen with a "real world" sole owner
situation and does not reflect the problems faced in trying to capture and understand
feedback from the system. Rarely does a resource manager have completely accurate, upto-date information on which to base its decisions. Furthermore, once a decision is made,
there is a period of time before the decision can be implemented. Also, there are costs and
difficulties involved in entering and exiting the fishery. For example, buying a new boat is a
relatively long-term investment. Users would not likely be so quick to enter and exit a
fishery, given that the boat has little use when not harvesting. In summary, in its baseline
form, the model strongly understates the feedback problem.

In order to make the model more realistically simulate the feedback problem several
changes were made. These changes were made and run independently of each other in
order to understand the effect they have on the sole owner's ability to make decisions.
First, the ability of the sole owner to make and implement decisions (i.e., make
adjustments to its fleet) was made more difficult. The first alteration was to only allow the
sole owner to make adjustments to the size of its fleet only every 5 years (instead of every
year). This change was made to entry and exit, not switching. By only making adjustments
every five years, the sole owner's flexibility is reduced, as it is unable to respond as quickly
to changes in the system. By only readjusting its fleet every five years, the sole owner
cannot track changes in the system as well as it can if it adjusts its fleet every year. Another
way to impair the sole owner's ability to adjust or respond to feedback is to delay the
implementation of its decision by 5 years. This represents some barriers to entry and exit.
For example, it may take 5 years to build a boat and find someone to fish it. Also, the delay
in exit could also represent problems associated with implementing the decision (e.g.,
perhaps the sole owner must give its captains 5-years notice before dismissing them). By
are held constant, profits are a linear function of the harvestable biomass available. Therefore, variability in

53

delaying the sole owner's decision by 5 years, its ability to track changes will be greatly
,diminished. For example, in a given year there may be a bloom in "herring", but the sole
owner may be responding to a bloom in "haddock that occurred 5 years ago that has
already been depleted.
The second way to impair feedback to the sole owner is to reduce the quality of the
information getting to the sole owner. This was done by creating errors in the information
and delaying the information getting to the sole owner. For example, creating errors might
represent poor stock assessments, including measurement (sampling) and modeVstatistica1
errors. Delaying the information is meant to represent decision-making based on old
information (e.g., due to lags between when assessments are done and when they are
interpreted). By degrading the quality of the feedback, the sole owner should have a more
difficult time learning how to respond appropriately to changes in the system.

Allowing the Sole Owner to Adjust Fleet Size Only Every 5 Years
By decreasing the frequency that the sole owner is able to make adjustments to the
size of its fleet, average wealth decreased substantially in both models (Table 5). The only
improvement in wealth was seen in the Big Box in the "redfish" fishery (Table 5).
However, average wealth in both models was still significantly higher than the wealth
generated under open access fishing (Table 1,Table 5). Average catch decreased in all

recruitment to the fishery reflects the variability that the sole owner faces in trying to capture feedback.

Table 5: B

Box vs. Little Box: Baseline vs. Delayed Sole Owner Decision Frequency
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fisheries in both models, and consequently, average mature biomass increased (in all species
besides "sand lance") (Table 5). Average system biomass (ages 2+) similarly increased in
both models (Table 5). In the Big Box, system biomass (ages 2+) increased for all species
besides "haddock and "sand lance" (Table 5). In the Little Box, system biomass (ages
2+) decreased in "redfish and "sand lance" (Table 5). In both models, the fleet size
decreased, but the Big Box continued to have a larger fleet than the Little Box (Table 5).
The slight advantage seen in the Big Box (i.e., in wealth generated) appears to be due to the
increased catch, which resulted from the slightly larger fleet. This suggests that the Big
Box's greater ability to switch makes it able to employ more boat profitably.

Delay the Implementation of the Sole Owner's Decision
When the sole owner's entry or exit decision was not implemented for 5 years, less
wealth was generated in both models (Table 6). The loss was significantly greater in the
Little Box compared to the Big Box (Table 6). The Big Box generated slightly more
average total wealth compared to the Little Box under this simulation, in all fisheries (Table
6). Average catch was also less in both models under this simulation and was greater in the
Big Box (Table 6). Average mature biomass was higher in the Little Box (in the "cod
fishery) (Table 6). Average system biomass (ages 2+) decreased only slightly in both
models (Table 6). In both models, " c o d and "sand lance" system biomass increased
(Table 6). Average Fleet size increased in both models and was greater in the Little Box
(Table 6), in the "haddock" and "herring" fisheries.

Error in the Information Used by Sole Owner
Introducing error into the models (i.e., degrading the quality of feedback), resulted
in a slight decrease in average total wealth in the Little Box model and a slight increase in
average total wealth in the Big Box model (Table 7). Thus, the Big Box model continued to
generate slightly more wealth compared to the Little Box (Table 7). The Little Box

Box vs. Little Box: Baseline vs. Delay Implementation of Sole Owner Decision
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generated higher average profits in the "redfish" fishery (Table 7). In the Big Box, wealth
increased in the "haddock and "herring" fisheries, while in the Little Box wealth
increased in "herring" fishery and remained the same in the "haddock fishery (Table 7).
Average catch in both models also increased and there was more catch in the Big
Box than in the Little Box (Table 7). In the Big Box, average catch increased in all fisheries
besides "redfish", while in the Little Box average catch increased in all fisheries (Table 7).
Average mature biomass and system biomass (ages 2 and up) declined in both models, and
there was more biomass in the Little Box than in the Big Box (Table 7). Average fleet size
also increased in both models (in all fisheries), with slightly more boats in the Big Box
fisheries (Table 7).

Delay Information getting to Sole Owner
When the sole owner based its decision on 5-year old data (i.e., delays due to data
collection and analysis), average total wealth in the Big Box sole was nearly the same as was
generated under baseline conditions (Table 8). The Little Box, on the other hand, generated
significantly less wealth (Table 8). In the Big Box, improvements were seen in the
"haddock and "herring" fisheries, while in the Little Box all fisheries produced less
wealth (Table 8). Average total catch increased slightly in the Big Box, while it decreased in
the Little Box (Table 8). In the Little Box, all fisheries experienced a decline in catch (Table
8). In the Big Box, average mature biomass did not change significantly, but there was an
increase in average mature biomass in the Little Box (Table 8). In the Little Box, total
mature biomass increased for all species besides "sand lance" (Table 8). Average system
biomass (ages 2 and up) did not change and remained similar between models (Table 8).
Average total fleet size declined significantly with information delays in the Little Box, while
in the Big Box fleet size remained nearly the same (Table 8).
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Conclusions - Imperfect Sole Owner Conditions
In general, these results suggest when the sole owner's ability to make and
implement decision is made more difficult, the Big Box sole owner is better able to capture
and respond to feedback from the system (Figure 5). Under these imperfect conditions, the
Big Box sole owner is slightly better able to track changes in biomass than the Little Box
sole owner.

Figure 5: Average Total Wealth Under Imperfect Sole Owner Simulations.
Error Bars indicate standard deviations.
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In each of the imperfect sole owner scenarios, the Little Box sole owner does worse in the
"cod fishery, compared to its baseline. Recall that it is probably the fast growing, stable
nature of the "cod population that allows the Little Box to do so well in that fishery under
baseline conditions. When the Little Box sole owner's ability to make decisions is
impaired, it is less able to take advantage of the "cod" population's fast growth and
stability.

It is important to note again that the variability in the system is not very reflective of
real world system variability. These results suggest that if system variability were increased,
then the Little Box sole owner would have a more difficult time trying to capture and

respond to feedback in the system. It was not possible to test this hypothesis with the model
because increasing variability was impossible without killing of one or more of the
harvested species. Nonetheless, we suspect that as the variability is increased, the Little Box
sole owner would have a more difficult time dealing with system variability than the Big
Box sole owner.

Limited Entry

In considering these results we wanted to try to determine the importance of entry
and exit to the sole owner in both models. In the limited entry system with switching, initial
fleet sizes were set approximately to the fleet sizes observed under baseline conditions and
the same for each model (total fleet size in both models was 1000 boats). Switching still
occurred within the system in the Big Box model and across systems in the Little Box
model. The initial total fleet size was slightly less than the baseline average in the Big Box
and slightly more than the baseline average in the Little Box (Table 9). In the Little Box,
only the "herring" fleet was slightly reduced. With switching, average fleet size in the Big
Box that resulted in the limited entry system was less boats in all fisheries besides "cod".

In the Little Box, average total fleet size was less in all fisheries compared to baseline
averages.
The Big Box did much worse under the limited entry system (Table 9). Average
total wealth in the Big Box decreased significantly compared to the baseline conditions and
was significantly less than was generated in the Little Box. Only "redfish wealth
increased in the Big Box (Table 9), this is possibly due to decreased costs with the smaller
fleet. On the other hand, average wealth increased in the Little Box (Table 9). The two
fisheries in the Little Box that produced less wealth were "cod" and "redfish" (Table 9).
Average catch decreased in the Big Box (in all fisheries besides "redfish") and increased in

the Little Box (in the "cod" fishery) (Table 9). Again, this may be due to the smaller fleet
in the Big Box and the larger fleet in the Little Box (compared to baseline averages).
Average mature biomass increased in the Big Box and decreased in the Little Box
(Table 9). In the Big Box, "herring" and "redfish" mature biomass increased, while in the
Little Box, only "herring" mature biomass increased (Table 9). Ln both models, average
system biomass (ages 2 and up) remained nearly the same as under baseline (Table 9).
However, in the Little Box there was more "sand lance" biomass than in the Big Box. In
the Big Box, average system biomass decreased for all species besides "redfish" and
"herring" (Table 9). In the Little Box, "herring", "haddock", and "sand lance" system
biomass increased (Table 9). Again, these results are probably due to the size of the fleet. If
the Big Box fleet were set slightly larger, average catch would probably increase (generating
more revenue, and possibly higher profits depending on the total costs) and the biomass of
the harvested species would be reduced. It is not surprising that the only species to increase
in size was "herring", which had a smaller fleet compared to its baseline. If the Little Box
were allocated fewer vessels then there may be more harvestable biomass and less "sand
lance".
The results do not indicate whether entry and exit is more important to one model
than the other. However, the results do suggest that the size of the fleet set by a limited
entry system is important and should be considered when implementing such a management
system. For example, if the Big Box were given a slightly larger fleet then it would likely
have done better. The fleet size set under this simulation was probably too small for the Big
Box sole owner and "good" for the Little Box. Given the dynamic and complex nature of
marine systems, determining the levels that effort should be limited to in a limited entry
system is a difficult, if not impossible, task. Consequently, unlike conventional fisheries
models, the models used in this thesis suggest that altering effort levels may not be
sufficient enough for capturing feedback and learning in complex marine systems.

Summary and Future Considerations
The purpose of this thesis was to explore and learn about feedback in complex
marine systems. Exploration of these two models suggest that allocating harvesting rights
at the system level may allow users to capture and respond to variability in complex marine
systems. Under initial sole owner conditions, feedback is captured and understood
perfectly. It appears that under perfect sole owner conditions (i.e., when feedback is
captured and not ambiguous) both management approaches are approximately equal in their
abilities to deal with system variability. As the sole owner's ability to capture and
understand feedback is made more imperfect (as is the case in real world situations), the Big
Box approach to management appears to result in slightly better decision-making.
Continued exploration of the models would have provided a better understanding of these
results, and consequently greater learning about the nature of the feedback problem in
complex systems.
Future explorations with these models should continue to look at the conditions of
imperfect feedback and imperfect response abilities, specifically how the sole owner is able
to cope under increasingly difficult conditions. For example, the profit trend signals to the
sole owner what is happening in the biological sector of the model because profits are a
function of the harvestable biomass available. If the signal between profits and the biological
status of the resource included more "noise", it would be more difficult for the sole owner
to harvest the resource in the most sustainable manner. "Noise" could be easily introduced
by non-constancies in prices, costs, and harvesting efficiencies. Another way to make the
sole owner's response ability more difficult in the model would be to introduce costs
associated with switching fisheries (both across regions and across species). Similarly,
exploring the assumption of non-perfectly fungible capital, by giving vessels a 20-year life
span, would offer insight into the feedback problem by making it costly and difficult to
undo entry/exit decisions.

It would also have been useful to explore questions regarding the significance of
recruitment variability in the fish populations. Although it is impossible to make the species
more variable without killing off one or more species, the individual growth rates and natural
mortality rates of the species could be altered to determine their influence on the sole
owner's ability to capture and respond to feedback. In particular, it would be interesting to
reduce the growth rate of "sand lance" so that it was not able to quickly take up available
space in the system. This would likely influence the variability in the other species. It would
also be interesting to find out what kind of variability would result if all five species were
harvested or if a different species was chosen as the unharvested species (e.g., "redfish,
with a much slower growth rate and turn over rate). The question of how individual life
history strategies influence system variability, and thus the sole owner's ability to
understand and respond to feedback is important and should be explored further.
Another interesting aspect of complex systems that was not explore in this thesis,
but could easily be explored with the models is flow between subsystems. Flow between
subsystems is one way feedback is lost. Larval drift was built into the model, but was
turned off for the purposes of this thesis. If turned on, the consequence of leakages between
subsystems could be explored. Depending on how larval drift is modeled, this leakage could
result in additional "noise" that the sole owner would have to deal with. Also, adding an
additional subsystem would not be extremely difficult and would allow for more
sophisticated exploration of flows between subsystems, and of the feedback problem in
general.
There are some questions raised with these models that cannot be addressed without
altering the entire design of the models. If time permitted, or if the models were to be
recreated from scratch, the most fundamental change would be to include system factors.
Although the models improve upon the conventional assumption that recruitment is
determined only by changes in the adult populations, by including the influence of a system
induced constraint, the model is only concerned with feedback gained from changes in

fishing effort. Other kinds of feedback that are not species specific include, among other
things, habitat, spatial distributions, and stock structure. Much of the ecosystem-based
management and scientific literature is focused on the importance of managing these system
factors. For example, Fogarty and Murawski (1998) noted the significance of protecting
habitat structure and complexity. Ames (1997) described how spatial distributions and
stock structure are important indicators of ecosystem health. Wilson et al. (1999) also
described how scale rnisperceptions can lead to a different kind of overfishing than is
typically recognized in fisheries management. Pauly et a1 (2000) described the need to
prevent what was called "fishing down the foodweb", which is described as a decline in the
average trophic level. These are only a few of many examples of kinds of system factors
that are important to understanding the feedback problem in complex marine systems and
should be included in future models.
Many marine resource management agencies (federal, regional, and state) are
moving towards or are considering an ecosystem approach in their attempt to provide a
holistic framework for managing fisheries." An ecosystem approach to management,
which would include humans as part of the system, needs to appreciate "multispecies
relationships as opposed to the single-species focus inherent in the notion of maximum
sustainable yield or optimal yield," or the conventional approach to management (Langton
and Haedrich, 1997).The Big BOX approach to management explored in this paper is more
compatible with such an ecosystem approach than the conventional, Little Box approach to
management .
The results of this thesis suggest that in highly variable complex marine systems we
can better capture feedback and consequently learn more by observing changes that occur at
the system level than at the species level. This suggests that a Big Box licensing system
should be considered as part of an ecosystem approach to management.
See Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management. A Report to Congress by the National Marine Fisheries
Service Ecosystem Principles Advisory Panel as mandated by the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries
Conservation and Management Act. July 1998.
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APPENDIX

SUMMARY OF MODEL SIMULATIONS

Table A.l: Summary of Big Box Model Simulations
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Table A.2: Summary of Little Box Model Simulations
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Table A.3: Summary of Average Change in Recruitment for all Simulations
BIG BOX

4
4

LITTLE BOX

Averages are for the last 400-years of N runs
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